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In his ISA Presidential Address, Thomas G. Weiss (2009: 253) wondered what happened ‘to 
the idea of world government, so central in the United States to public debate of the 1930s 
and 1940s, and why has it been replaced by ‘global governance’’? He tied debates about 
world government to the history of 20th century world organizations, the League of Nations 
and the United Nations. Indeed, there were hopes after both the First and Second World War 
that a world state would be established in the immediate future. For instance, in 1914-17, 
H.G.Wells aroused attention in advocating a representative world congress as the basis of the 
League (Partington, 2003: 79-80; Wagar, 2004: 160-1). In the aftermath of the Great War, in 
1920, Wells expressed his deep disappointments at the real-world historical developments. 
‘This League of Nations as it was embodied in the Covenant of April 28 th 1919, was not a 
League of Peoples at all; it was, the world discovered, a league of ‘states, dominions or 
colonies’.’ It was, moreover, a league of victorious war-allies. (Wells, 1931: 1118-9). 
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In the 1940s, it was the emerging Cold War that spelled an end to the then widespread hopes 
for a world state (because the Russian Revolution would not have occurred without the First 
World War, the Cold War was intertwined with the earlier layer of 1914-18 and its aftermath). 
Hans Morgenthau’s classic textbook Politics Among Nations was written and rewritten during 
the Cold War. The book was a candid argument for a world state, but it was also based on the 
premise that ‘the world state is unattainable […] in the world in our time’ (1961: 539). 
Morgenthau died in 1980 and the Cold War ended a decade later. Since the early 1990s, more 
people may have been discussing the ideas of global security, democracy and justice than that 
of the world state per se, yet all these interconnected ideas have a common background in 
cosmopolitan philosophies that have existed for centuries in their modern form, and much 
longer in other forms (Bartelson, 2009; Linklater, 1982; and Patomäki, 2010, trace their 
origins back to ancient scientific and philosophical conceptions).  
 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) remains the best-known symbol for modern universalist 
cosmopolitanism. In his Perpetual Peace and other political essays, Kant (1983) opened a 
floor where later discussions could find their path to the future within an array of terms such 
as federalism, confederalism, armistices, truces, leagues of peace, contracts of peoples, peace 
contracts, allied states, law of peoples, and many somewhat intranslatable ideas as the 
difference between a ‘Völkerbund’ and a ‘Völkerstaat’, a ‘league of nations’ or a ‘state of 
peoples’. Kant was not arguing for a world state, however. He warned about the Dantean idea 
of a ‘universal monarchy’, but argued for an ‘always more extended union’ – a phrase 
repeated in the double phrase of ‘an ever closer union’ and a guaranteed ‘steady expansion’ 
among the preambles of The Treaty of Rome in 1957 (for a discussion on Kant and European 
integration, see Harste, 2009). 
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During the past century, the majority of thoughts spent on the concept world state focus on the 
issue of whether the formation of a future world state is desirable or attainable. In one form or 
another the issues have tended to be, first and foremost, normative questions. For instance, 
would such a world state, particularly if compared to a federation of states (as suggested by 
Kant), degenerate into universal despotism (Zolo, 1997), or could it in some form be 
democratic (Held, 1995). In addition to these discussions, many contributions in the field of 
International Relations, particularly in the tradition of political realism, have argued that 
although a world state may in fact be desirable in order to overcome the problems emerging 
from the nature of states as self-interested, power-seeking entities, it is exactly because of 
existing real powers the latter that a world state will not emerge in the foreseeable future (see 
Aron, 1962; Morgenthau, 1961). 
 
In contrast to these traditional (and ongoing) discussions, which in one respect or another are 
invariably about the (normative) desirability of a world state imagined largely in analogy to 
the modern territorial-cum-nation-state, two different strands of dealing with the question of a 
world state have emerged over recent years. They differ from the established discussions on 
the subject mentioned above in that they are less focussed on normative arguments about the 
subject. On the one hand are those contributions, mostly stemming from a sociological 
background, which argue that in one form or another a world or global state (or a form of 
‘world statehood’) already exists, that various structures and elements of the world political 
system have consolidated into a form which represents some form of statehood. However this 
form is quite unlike the one to be found in modern territorial nation-states (see Shaw, 2000; 
Albert and Stichweh, 2007). On the other hand are those contributions which argue that 
although a world state may not yet exist, its emergence is inevitable. This inevitability is then 
derived either from a macro-historical argument about a permanent decline in the number of 
polities on the globe over the centuries and even millennia (see Carneiro, 2004), or from a 
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more philosophical argument in which only the world state can solve basic problems of 
security and recognition (see Wendt, 2003). To this may be added global-Keynesian and 
similar political economy arguments about the necessity of a global state formation. 
 
The present special issue seeks to contribute to the newer discussion on the world state by 
proceeding mostly along the two non-traditional lines of thought on the world state, and by 
further posing questions about the viability or sustainability of a would-be world state. While 
on the one hand the underlying diagnosis is shared that a form of world statehood is in 
existence already, the diagnoses of ‘inevitability’ are usually guided more by the leitmotif of 
modern territorial nation-statehood expanded to a global scale, and thus miss the point of the 
former discussion. Yet we argue that quite a number of insights can be gained from both the 
inevitability and viability discussions as these highlight that future scenarios and thoughts 
about its further evolution mark a blind spot when thinking about contemporary world 
statehood, about something is already in existence and in the process of evolvement. 
 
Contemporary world statehood 
 
Structures and forms of global governance can arguably be seen to more and more exhibit 
characteristics of an, albeit rudimentary, world state as they rest on processes of global 
constitutionalization, the evolution of a global governance and public sphere, and the 
semantics of an international community. However, the emergence of world statehood cannot 
be seen as a process of the formation of a global homogenous political space, and even less as 
the emergence of a global unitary state. Quite to the contrary, the emergence of world 
statehood constitutively rests on the simultaneity of processes of constitutionalization and 
fragmentation in the global political and legal systems. 
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Talking about the evolution of world statehood at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
only makes sense if not read against the traditional concept of the modern state. This concept 
strictly ties together statehood as a form of organizing political space with the nation and/or 
the territorial state (and as such also forms the main point of reference for the majority of 
discussions on the ‘world state’ in political philosophy). And the concept of world statehood 
only makes sense if contrasted to ‘Westphalian’ model of territorially exclusive statehood 
constitutively embedded in the body of international law and underpinning what Ulrich Beck 
and others have identified as ‘methodological nationalism’ (see Beck and Sznaider, 2006; 
Chernilo, 2007). 
 
The notion of an ‘exclusive’ statehood here primarily refers to the image of a unitary political 
space organized as a state, which precludes different overlapping forms of state authority to 
coexist within the same space. In contrast to this concept, the notion of ‘inclusive’ statehood 
means that different forms of political orders organized as a state structure within the same 
geographical space without necessarily being mediated through a final rule for dealing with 
norm collisions (i.e. the figure of sovereignty; see Shaw, 2000). We argue that in the end 
global governance can be conceptualized as the emergence of forms of inclusive statehood on 
a global level. However, and in marked contrasts to images of ‘new medievalism’ (see Bull, 
1977) as a patchworks of cross-cutting loyalties and overlapping spheres of authority, this 
development also pertains to the emergence of a global level for making collective decisions, 
a level which however does not displace the relevant national settings. It is in such a context 
that questions about political legitimacy beyond the nation-state arise almost automatically. 
This is even more so if the emergence of global political structures is seen to exhibit elements 
of world statehood.  
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Today, the idea of an emerging world statehood particularly rests on the diagnosis of a 
consolidation of structures of global governance, understood as the condition of the possibility 
to supply capacities for collectively binding decision-making in a global context, as well as on 
the observation of the development of a semantics of globality which accompanies the 
formation of political structures. In the following, these elements of an emerging world 
statehood will be sketched briefly before in the following we can lay open the ensuing 
problems with its democratic legitimacy. 
 
It seems to be barely disputed that in a globalized world it is not only nation-states which 
‘govern’. ‘Governing beyond the nation-state’ (Zürn, 1998) takes place in different 
international institutions and regulatory regimes which increasingly are underpinned by legal 
rules. While global governance thus partly takes place as ‘governance without government’ 
and partly as ‘governance with government’ and while a significant part of global governance 
research focuses on the changing boundaries between public and private regulatory agents in 
this context, ‘the state’ has to a large part disappeared from the discussion on global 
governance. Not unlike European integration research with the for some time quite prominent 
notion of the EU as an entity ‘sui generis’, this ‘loss’ of the state however entails severe 
disadvantages in that it prematurely gives up on one possibility to identify and designate the 
unity of the diversity of global regulatory arrangements. The emergence of governing 
functions on a global level and the process of international organization which increases the 
capacities for arriving at collectively binding decisions in international politics suggest that it 
is insufficient to merely perceive global governance as a more or less disorganized process of 
regime formation. It seems appropriate to talk about an emergent property of the political 
system of world society in this case, particularly as the structure of global governance give 
rise to their own specific symbolic systems which cannot be reduced to or mapped upon the 
properties of international politics as the interaction context of sovereign nation-states. Of 
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course, such an assessment alone does not necessitate approaching such an emergent property 
with the notion of the state. This is only suggested by the observation that this emergent 
property is accompanied by different forms of law formation. And this is regardless of the 
(theoretically interesting) question whether the contemporary evolution of world law can be 
understood to express a process of constitutionalization or whether it is rather characterized 
by the emergence of functionally specific global constitutions (in the plural). Decisive in the 
present context is that one ‘global constitution’ (Fischer-Lescano, 2005) based on human 
rights norms has emerged at the interstices of the political and the legal system of world 
society and that this global constitution defines minimum standards of legitimacy for global 
governance (see also the similar but also contrastive notion of new constitutionalism of 
disciplinary neoliberalism in Gill, 1998). Of course, such a global constitution cannot be 
characterized by an ‘act of full legitimation of global governance which could be traced back 
to a world sovereign’ (Fischer-Lescano, 2005: 30, own transl.), this global constitution is 
possibly only ‘legitimized partially and mediated through states’ (ibid.).  
 
However, it is particularly this partial reliance of a global constitution on the existing nation-
states which suggests using the notion of the state for describing the emergent, 
constitutionally legalized structures of global governance. One of the main advantages of 
using the notion of the state in this context is that if understood in terms of inclusive statehood 
it can be used to counter the quite contra-intuitive idea that governing beyond the nation state 
would take place in a space of political actors and organizations which not only lie beyond the 
purview of the nation-state, but beyond any form of statehood itself. 
 
However, using the notion of the state in relation to global governance is not only suggested 
by the increasing coupling between developments within the political and the legal systems of 
world society. It is also suggested by the fact that the emergent property of the global political 
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system increasingly produces forms of self-description and self-observation of itself as a level 
of world politics. It is particularly the semantic figure of an ‘international community’ which 
in this context fulfils the function of a global public (cf. Jäger, 2004), as the formula through 
which the political system of world society describes itself. In doing so, it ascribes to this 
system the property of some kind of social order (and not, for example, the ‘anarchy’ of 
political realism). 
 
One indication that the ‘international community’ is consolidated as the formula for the self-
description of the political system of world society which contains elements of statehood can 
be found in tendencies in which this international community not only serves as a normative 
horizon for observing the actions of nations states, but is increasingly specified according to 
the conditions under which states can (see Saunders, 2006) or should (see Hahn, 2006) be 
excluded from this international community. These questions are closely connected with those 
regarding the (sources of) legitimacy of different kinds of actors like states, NGOs, or 
international direct administrations in the global political system (Clark, 2003; Collingwood, 
2006; Zaum, 2006). It has been convincingly argued in relation to the global constitution 
mentioned above that in additional to traditional sovereignty rights the human rights regime 
has established itself as a second main source of legitimacy and in this sense as a conditio sine 
qua non for inclusion into international community (Bonacker, 2003).  
 
The idea that some kind of world statehood can be seen to emerge needs to be safeguarded 
against potential conceptual overstretch. It would certainly lead to such an overstretch if it 
were interpreted to mean an exclusive form, displacing other kinds of statehood (in the sense 
that there can only be one state at one place at any one time). Thus, what is also explicitly not 
meant with the diagnosed form of an emerging world statehood is that what can be witnessed 
in and through such a form would be a dominant structure characterizing the political as well 
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as the legal systems of world society. What it seeks to signify is the simultaneity of various 
forms of differentiation within the function systems of world society as well as the variety of 
forms of couplings between the different function systems. Both the political as well as the 
legal system are no longer unequivocally characterized by a primacy of segmentary 
differentiation (into nation-states, national legal systems). However, it also seems implausible 
to characterize either of them through a primacy of stratificatory differentiation (see Zürn et 
al., 2007). Rather, what can be observed is a diversity of forms of differentiation and structure 
formation (see Buzan and Albert, 2010). And it is in this context in which the evolution of 
world statehood signifies one process of structure formation as an emergent property of the 
political system of world society. 
 
World and globe, logics of statehood 
 
It will be noted that the contributions to this special issue use the notions of ‘world’ and 
‘global’ more or less interchangeably, and mostly do not come down with very strict 
definitions of ‘state’. Regarding the use of the ‘world’ and the ‘global’, this indeed is in 
keeping with the common practice regarding politics, where usually no substantial distinction 
is made between ‘world politics’ or ‘global politics’. Although barely reflected on thus far, 
this situation on the other does not pertain most notably to issues of ‘global governance’ or a 
‘global civil society’ (references to ‘world governance’ or a ‘world civil society’ are rather 
rare). While the notion of the ‘global state’ has made some notable appearances (see Shaw, 
2000), it seems to remain in a minority position in terms of usage compared to the ‘world 
state’. While this is not the place to address the difference between the ‘world’ and ‘global’ in 
any detail, we would like to propose a concluding thought that it may actually be worthwhile 
to accord it more analytical importance when thinking about the future of the world state in 
future studies. 
 10 
 
Historically, the concept of ‘world’ is Germanic and finds its origins from ‘wer’ (‘who’) plus 
‘alt’ (‘old’), i.e. the old German ‘weralt’ and ‘uueralt’, eventually related to a ‘creation of the 
world’. Whereas the ‘global’ has a closed finite form in space (‘the Earth’, the ‘globe’), the 
‘world’ presents a legacy of open and evolving complexity (Braun, 1992; Stichweh, 2000; 
Luhmann, 1997: 145-171, 806-12; 2000: 18f, 59f). Thus, the concept of ‘world’ is rather 
temporal than spatial. First referring back to the history of mankind, since St. Augustine it 
also began to refer to a future under the impact of ideas like the eternal city of God; hence the 
‘end of the world’ became a negative apocalyptic idea along with the reverse positive idea of 
a utopian future world. Under the influence of Mediterranean monotheistic semantics, the late 
Roman Empire began to legitimate itself with reference to a universal world and paved the 
way for later early modern notions of a ‘monarchia universalis’ that transcended its actual 
imperial and spatial reach (see Moraw, 1982). The implication was that territorial power 
(‘potestatis’) – situated in a spatial terrain, a state territory or spanning the entire Earth –, 
should achieve legitimacy or authority (‘auctoritas’) from a universal ‘world’. It is in this 
sense that ‘globality’ refers to the range of decision-making, while the ‘world’ refers to its 
possible acceptance in an open universe.  
 
As noted, the present Special Issue is no exemption to the rule that the concepts of ‘world’ 
and ‘global’ are usually used interchangeably. Yet, there may be good reasons to re-establish 
the historical distinction, particularly when it comes to the possible future of a world state. As 
hinted at, the distinction between the ‘global’ and the ‘world’ within it carries a distinction 
between power on the one hand, and authority and legitimacy on the other hand. Thus, while 
the notion of a ‘global state’ would primarily hint at the range of decision-making (i.e. ‘global 
governance’), the notion of a ‘world state’ would imply interpretation frames legitimating 
such decisions (see also Walker, 2010). Such a distinction builds on a semantic distinction 
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established in French since Leibniz, i.e. the distinction between ‘globalization’ and a more 
universally oriented ‘mondialization’ (Leibniz, 1695). The ‘world’ takes form as a polity 
subject to rationalities, reason and enlightening. Hence, a world state is in a process from a 
past constitutionalization towards a future of becoming a state of authorization: its claims go 
beyond and transcend its global reach.  
 
Not least following the discovery and exploration of the ‘New World’ the secular question 
then arose whether the world may actually contain conceptions and classifications different 
from the European ones? On the one hand, this can be seen as the historical starting point of a 
blurring distinction between notions of world and globe. On the other hand, it re-established 
the idea of ‘world’ as one of meaning and of a micro-cosmic ‘world of experience’, thus at the 
same time opening the realm for a subjective aesthetic, yet reasonable ‘world view’ 
(‘Weltanschauung’) (Kant, 1790: § 26), and for the idea of a republican common world, a 
cosmopolitan world with ‘world citizens’ (Kant, 1795). The more the atlas and the image that 
mapped the entire earth spread, the more the cosmopolitan world became distinguished from 
it. Hence the order and classifications found in the still more territorial spatial forms could be 
reordered and reclassified in discussions about ‘world history’, ‘world trade’ and ‘world 
markets’ etc. However, in contrast to the fact that very few would nowadays dispute the 
existence of, for example, a ‘world market’ or ‘world trade’, the existence of ‘world state’ 
would be disputed by many, perhaps most.  
 
These observation regarding the background of the oscillating use of the ‘world’ and the 
‘global’ also point to the rationale why the very concept of the ‘state’ cannot be fixed when 
talking about a world state. Unlike in the majority of normative discussions about the 
desirability of a world state, the main point of reference here is not the legal ideal of the 
sovereign territorial nation-state writ large. Rather, and reflecting on the fact that historically 
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there have been numerous paths of state formation and that different logics of statehood have 
always coexisted (and continue to coexist – witness the intensive and ongoing discussions on 
whether the European Union ‘is’ as state; cf. in particular also the contribution by Brunkhorst 
to this volume), the present Special Issue operates on the basis of the assumption that it is 
probably futile to look for but one logic of world state formation (see also again Shaw, 2000). 
And that indeed, if the focus on the modern sovereign state is relinquished, there is the 
possibility that we may actually live in an era in which some form of global statehood is in 
existence (and has been for a while) already. Yet that the emergence of a world state in the 
sense just described, i.e. as a legitimized form of making collectively binding decisions with a 
global range, is still a part of both some present futures as well as possibly of the future 
present. The question of collective violence complicates things even further and is closely 
connected to the questions of legitimacy and legitimation.  
 
World state futures as geo-historical possibilities: outline of the Special Issue 
 
When at least some ‘world statehood’ is argued to be in existence, and similarly when the 
emergence of a world state is seen as inevitable, the discussion is not concerned about abstract 
normative claims or cut off from concrete world history. Rather the focus is on real geo-
historical possibilities and on the future that is either in some way already present or can be 
anticipated in a meaningful way – and, as is well known, anticipations are also an important 
part of the present world as well. This is the starting point of our special issue, ‘Present 
Futures and Future Presents – World State Scenarios for the 21st Century’. Our attempts at 
devising long-term scenarios or theoretically reflexive anticipations of possible and likely 
futures, a technique widely employed in many fields in the politics-making and business 
communities, is not to be misunderstood as an abstract exercise removed from practice. Quite 
to the contrary: As complex social systems are characterized by possibilities for various 
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outcomes and qualitative emergence rather than by pre-determined regularities or invariances, 
the envisioning of futures in the present can open the spaces of thinking about, and shaping, 
the processes that are bringing about future presents – as much as they must not be mistaken 
to be predictions about the future. Our special issue is an exercise in devising possible global 
futures with a focus on the question of an emerging world state or (elements of) statehood, 
and on assessing the viability and legitimacy of such present or emerging formations. 
 
Hence, we are not only trying to devise scenarios about developments that are leading or may 
lead to world statehood in the course of the 21st century, either in response to key global 
problems, risks and uncertainties (ecology, economy, technology, war, violence), or because 
of the inherent logic of the human ethico-political evolution (logic of recognition, stages of 
moral learning etc). We are also asking: how will political communities and the legitimate 
control of violence evolve? What are the ways in which path-dependent processes might 
determine the type and structures of a global state formation? Does a world state really 
provide a solution to the identified problems and would it be viable? Might a world state too 
be only a temporary phase in the history of humanity? 
 
The first essay, by Christopher Chase-Dunn and Hiroko Inoue, analyses the emergence of a 
world state in terms of historical longue durée. Their contribution is mainly about the 
evolution of global governance in the Europe-centred modern world-system since the 15th 
century, but the analysis of the trajectory of the modern system is done in the context of the 
study of human socio-cultural evolution on a millennial scale. The patterned sequence of the 
evolution of increasingly centralized and capacious global governance institutions is 
examined with an eye to the prospects for speeding up the processes of global state formation 
and the democratization of the institutions of global governance. The authors propose 
scenarios both about (i) a future in which major calamities will occur in the coming decades 
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regardless of the efforts of far-sighted world citizens and social movements, and (ii) a future 
in which an effective and democratic global government might emerge in the absence of any 
such huge disaster. What are the conditions of the latter possibility? According to Chase-
Dunn and Inoue, ‘one scenario would involve a coalescent party-network of the New Global 
Left that would emerge from the existing ‘movement of movements’ that have been 
participating in the World Social Forum.’ 
 
In his contribution, Hauke Brunkhorst provides a very different perspective from arguments 
for the establishment of a cosmopolitan order and some form of cosmopolitan statehood. He 
argues that a form of cosmopolitan order has been around for quite a long time and that 
particularly cosmopolitan and national statehood have co-evolved, rather than the possibility 
of the former depending on the demise of the latter (as if often assumed in debates on 
cosmopolitanism). Like Chase-Dunn and Inoue, Brunkhorst approaches the world state 
problematic from a deep historical perspective, arguing that whatever position we may 
assume, we are already within a cosmopolitan world order. In this context, he reads the nation 
state to be a ‘borderline case of statehood’. The argument is developed that the co-evolution 
of national and cosmopolitan statehood can be traced through different stages since the Papal 
and the Protestant revolutions beginning in the twelfth and sixteenth centuries respectively. 
However, it is only in the twentieth century that within cosmopolitanism a new idea of 
freedom, contained in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is 
invented. Brunkhorst argues that the exclusion of formal inequalities, which was once the 
legal principle of the normative integration of the modern nation-state, has now become the 
principle of the normative integration of world law or the constitutive principle of global 
constitutionalism. 
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In the third essay of this special issue, Bob Jessop studies multi-scalar meta-governance and 
its implications for global governance and world state formation. Jessop addresses problems 
of global governance from a complexity-theoretical perspective that also draws on state 
theory, governance theory, and critical political economy. Like Chase-Dunn/Inoue and 
Brunkhorst, Jessop see many elements of world statehood already in existence. However, 
Jessop’s principal conclusion is that, while a world state proper may be possible in formal, 
institutional terms, its actual operation will be shaped by the world of states as well as the 
uneven development of the capitalist world market. On theoretical grounds, he argues, it 
seems unlikely that a world state would become the dominant scale within any system of 
multi-scalar meta-governance, especially in a networked, asymmetrical, and still hierarchical 
world of states in which environmental and economic problems are major sources of political 
pressure and conflict. This conclusion points to a basic paradox in the idea of political 
activities oriented to the creation of a world state: an effective world state oriented to good 
governance is implausible on fundamental theoretical and political grounds but efforts to 
develop such a state made in the spirit of romantic public irony are justified and may prove 
beneficial. 
 
In the fourth article, Ronald Tinnevelt explores the substance and structures of different 
possible world state formations. Instead of arguing for the necessity or inevitability of some 
form of world state and presenting the defining features of a world state, he merely discusses 
the barriers that political and legal theorists face when they want to go against the flow of 
global governance and argue for some form of minimal world state. He starts by 
distinguishing between a maximal and minimal world state. Tinneveld asks whether a 
minimal world state can remain a complementary or secondary state in the long run. If not, 
Tinneveld argues, the model of a minimal world state will move in the direction of a unified 
global state and will again be exposed to some of the traditional arguments against a world 
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state. From this point of view he analyses the conditions of and barriers to a minimal world 
state. For example, by recognizing the importance of the dual principles of federalism and 
subsidiarity, the model of a minimal world state could counteract the pluralism, infeasibility, 
and bounded citizenship objection. However, a more fundamental, problem is whether the 
model of a minimal world state – especially a federation – is able to by-pass some of the 
pressures for hierarchical centralization that are characteristic of the national state. The ‘all 
affected’ principle poses far-reaching challenges. As the process of globalization is leading to 
an increase in transboundary issues, the category of ‘all affected’ inevitably implies a certain 
centralizing tendency. Tinneveld concludes that even a minimal world state strikes a fragile 
balance between a simultaneous need for centralization and decentralization. 
 
In the last contribution, Heikki Patomäki explores the conditions of legitimation of a world 
political community (WPC), possibly assuming the form of a world or even global state. His 
starting point is that every argument about the possibility, desirability and/or inevitability of a 
world state constitutes a standpoint for assessing its future legitimacy and sustainability. The 
reason for posing questions about legitimation in a future WPC is to shed light on the possible 
ethico-political grounds for further global integration. Among other things, the analysis of 
elements and dynamics of legitimation also facilitates the assessment of the feasibility of 
different paths towards planetary-scale integration. What are the deep but historically 
evolving normative and institutional underpinnings that can make a sustainable WPC 
possible? What could provide legitimacy to a WPC and thus make it viable; and what are the 
potential and likely pitfalls of such an abstract, large-scale political community? Patomäki 
argues that while the standard security-military and functionalist political economy arguments 
for planetary unification and political community are important and may work to a point, after 
that they tend to become irrelevant, counterproductive, or even self-defeating, especially in 
terms of legitimation. What ultimately matters are the moral standards and political 
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judgements that constitute multiple political actions and struggles in a future WPC. In other 
words, the argument is that although a viable WPC is possible, it is possible only 
contingently, depending on manifold, multi- layered and complex conditions of legitimation. 
Therefore, Patomäki focuses on theories of civilizing process and stages of ethico-political 
learning. Collective human learning not only explains the quest for democratization but also 
points towards cosmopolitan moral sentiments. However, there is an internal relationship 
between democracy and identity, and identities tend to be particular. Patomäki concludes by 
proposing a reconstructive way to think about world political identity. 
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